Asymptosis

Michael Bloomberg:

The simple fact is, this building is private property, and the owners have a right to use the building as a house of worship, and the government has no right whatsoever to deny that right. And if it were tried, the courts would almost certainly strike it down as a violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Should government attempt to deny private citizens the right to build a house of worship on private property based on their particular religion? That may happen in other countries, but we should never allow it to happen here.

I would add:

1. The moderate muslim community, which uniformly disowns and decries terrorism in the name of Islam as despicable and contrary to their religion, is the most powerful voice there is against those terrorists. There are few more effective things we can do that empower, embrace, and encourage that voice.

2. The voices against the mosque are raised not in prospect of any future good, but in angry reaction to past evils. Vengeance, revenge, should never serve as the spur to our actions, because the urge for vengeance — no matter how innate and irresistible it is to the human character — is always about looking backward, never forward.

Retribution — rooted in cold, clear, calculated reasoning and intended to prevent future evils — is often essential and inescapable. But vengeance-driven actions are almost inevitably counterproductive.

That’s what I think, anyway.

Asymptosis Foreign policy, Free Speech, Politics, Religion, Uncategorized, constitution

I’ve long lauded Jim Manzi for his cogent and convincing arguments against carbon taxes. He’s the antithesis of the “1998 was really hot! Look: it’s cooler now!” school of head-in-in-the-sand self-delusionists. Rather, he takes the 2007 IPCC report as the best available consensus scientific knowledge we have, and uses it to think through a clear-eyed, long-term cost-benefit analysis of carbon taxes/cap-and-trade. Anyone interested in this subject should read this article (and note that it’s published in the regular “In-House Critics” column of the  decidedly lefty New Republic, which speaks volumes about which side of this debate is willing to tolerate and consider — and yes, publish — strongly argued dissenting views).

When I consider arguments in favor of climate legislation, Manzi’s thinking is what I measure those arguments against. Here’s his argument in small (my emphasis for easy skimming):

• “the cost of policies designed to limit the rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide to 450 parts per million (ppm) average a little over 6 percent of global GDP by 2100 (with a very wide range of estimates). That is, we would start paying a cost today that would rise to about 6 percent of world output by 2100 in order to only partially avoid a problem that would have expected costs of about 3 percent of world output sometime later than 2100.”

• “hedging your bets and keeping your options open is almost always the right strategy. Money and technology are our raw materials for options. … the loss of economic and technological development that would be required to eliminate all theorized climate change risk (or all risk from genetic technologies or, for that matter, all risk from killer asteroids) would cripple our ability to deal with virtually every other foreseeable and unforeseeable risk.”

Yes, he addresses the uncertainty/risk/probability issues of global warming — notably those from Harvard’s Martin Weitzman.

It’s a compelling argument: given the risk scenario painted by the IPCC in 2007 — and its uncertainty — our best response is to promote economic and technological growth and development, so we have the resources to address problems in the future, when we have a clearer picture of what the problems are.

But the counterarguments are also very strong. If Manzi incorporated them into his thinking, I think he would come to very different conclusions. Respondents at The New Republic have offered several of them; I will steal from them unabashedly, and add a few of my own.

• The 2007 IPCC report is getting long in the tooth — it’s based on the best research from four to six years ago. Recent research is (almost uniformly) far more alarming. Two examples: 1. “The area of summer sea ice remaining during 2007-2009 was about 40% less than the average projection from the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.” 2. One report posits a circa 5% chance that large portions of the planet will be rendered uninhabitable — including the eastern U.S..

• The 2007 report specifically did not make projections for sea-level rise. The modeling of ice-sheet behavior was considered too difficult at the time. The economic costs from rising seas could dwarf all others combined. A cost-benefit analysis that doesn’t include those costs doesn’t tell us much.

A 6%-of-GDP insurance policy against those eventualities starts to sound more reasonable. But even the 6% estimate has serious problems.

• Manzi assumes that carbon taxes will add to, not replace, other taxes. Economists agree that consumption taxes and “Pigovian” taxes — taxing negative externalities — are more economically efficient (they result in greater economic growth and prosperity) than many of our current taxes, like those on income, corporate profits, etc. A carbon tax is a Pigovian consumption tax. If our tax base shifts in that direction, the result is more economic efficiency, yielding the very result — faster growth and development — that Manzi champions.

• He assumes the need for a global taxing regime, ignoring the benefits to the U.S. of a unilaterally imposed carbon tax. The long-term savings in national defense and security from reduced fossil-fuel consumption are darned hard to predict, but even most righties will acknowledge that we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if there was no oil over there. That war will cost us trillions, all told — somewhere north of 25% of U.S. GDP for a year. And that’s before even considering the fuel that it poured on the fire of global jihad. That was one damned expensive insurance policy to ensure future oil supplies.

• He ignores the threat that global warming poses to U.S. national security, as detailed by those left-wing nut jobs at the Pentagon in their Quadrennial Defense Review for 2010 (PDF): ”climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.”

• He ignores the truly horrific, potentially even apocalyptic human impact of global warming, and a “mere” 3% decline in GDP, especially outside the developed world. (Quite resoundingly demonstrating Jonathan Haidt’s findings about libertarians’ lack of compassion.) As Nate Silver has pointed out (H/T Bradford Plumer) we could eliminate 43% of the world’s people and only reduce world GDP by 5%.

As I said, I greatly admire Jim Manzi’s thinking. But I have to say that his failure to include these points in that thinking gives the strong impression of confirmation bias.

Asymptosis Economics, Energy Independence, Foreign policy, Global Warming, Politics, Uncategorized

Even as some vaguely sane voices on the right — notably former Reagan budget officials — are acknowledging that the thirty-year experiment in “starve the beast” has failed…it seems to be working.

The austerity principle is finally taking hold — just when the opposite should be true.

The basics of fiscal and monetary policy aren’t really rocket science: you loosen, spend, and cut taxes in the bad times to stimulate the economy, and tighten up when the economy’s going strong.

But now — thanks as usual to the deranged “theorists” on the right (they don’t care much for facts and empirics) — the whole world seems to be doing the opposite (with misguided encouragement from the IMF).

After three decades of almost nonstop Keynesian stimulus, in good times and bad — by the very people who supposedly abhor said stimulus — it’s up to the Democrats, once again (viz: Clinton), to clean up the mess that Red-Ink Republicans have left us with.

Obama’s got us on track to flatten the curve. Can he reverse those thirty years and pull it back down?

He has not succeeded in his first year and a half in office. Obviously a failed presidency.

Asymptosis Uncategorized

Has anyone else noticed?

McLellan. MacArthur. McChrystal.

Makes me think of this post.

As Sen. Jim Webb, D-Va., argues in his 2004 book, “Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America,” the Scots-Irish are a particularly pugnacious people, self-reliant and hyper-individualistic, who place honor above profit.

…

Once Democrats, Webb says the Scots-Irish created the “core culture around which Red State America has gathered and thrived.”

And in that context, don’t forget: McCain.

Asymptosis Uncategorized

Cross-posted at Angry Bear.

Thanks to yeoman’s work by Larry Bartels, Mike Kimel, and a host of others, we’ve seen that over many decades, the American economy has performed far better, by almost any measure, under Democratic presidents.

Larry Bartels’ key graph mapping income growth by quintile, 1948–2005 (from page 33 of Unequal Democracy) is perhaps the best demonstration of that.  Even the rich get richer, faster, under Democratic presidents. The poor and the middle class get far richer:

All those findings came as a surprise to me when I first saw the data. I’d pretty much accepted the Republican “party of growth” party line, after hearing it repeated thousands of times over several decades. It turns out that at least for American presidents, it just isn’t true. Not even close.

Even though the data’s been sliced, diced, and analyzed every which way from Sunday, with consistent results, critics still try to second-guess it. Many or most of these objections are spurious — statistically illiterate, logically flawed, or just plain self-contradictory special pleading.

But at least one repeated question does bear examination: What about Congress? Don’t they supposedly control the purse-strings?

Here are some questions — some of which may seem to have “obvious” answers, though we really can’t know until we look systematically:

1. Do Democrats and Republicans in the different branches deliver systematically different results in spending, revenues, and deficits (and more tenuously, second-order effects like real GDP per capita)?

2. What are those party differences? Are they large differences?

3. Do those difference themselves differ depending on whether the parties are in control of the Senate, the House, and/or the Presidency? IOW, do Dems/Pubs act differently in the House than they do in the Senate or the presidency?

4. Which branches have the greatest effects on different economic measures?

5. In which branches do Democratic and Republican results differ the most? Does that vary depending on the economic measure you’re looking at?

6. Do certain party combinations in the Senate/House/Presidency show systematically different results in spending, revenues, etc.? Is there any sign of an optimal or dystopic combination?

7. Do there seem to be systematic differences between mixed and monolithic control of the branches?

8. Directly addressing the objections mentioned above: does an analysis of congressional results undercut, disprove, or otherwise alter the conclusions from the research on presidential outcomes linked above?

To look into these questions I built a spreadsheet for the years 1961–2009, based on one built by my friend Steve, who tagged all the years for which party controlled each branch. (Thanks, Steve!) The spreadsheet (with data sources cited) is here.*

I chose to start in ’61 not only because the period basically spans my sentient life (self-serving bias?), but because 1. it’s a reasonably long period (49 years), and 2. by then the wild economic swings following the Depression and World War II had settled down. If anyone wants to extend the period backward, it’s an easy matter to add the data from the sources cited in the spreadsheet.

You can jump down to the resulting graphs, or even the summary, but some discussion is in order first.

Details

The central issue here: there are many different ways to look at this data. I’ve chosen ones that I think will give the most inclusive, comprehensive, and comprehensible insights into the questions above, revealing both the big picture and the sometimes messy, contradictory, and ambiguous results. Given the nature of the data, it simply can’t answer some of the questions  above.

I detail my choices here. I encourage others to use the spreadsheet to create different views — hopefully widely representative ones, eschewing intentional (or even unconscious) cherry-picking. My choices were driven by just plain curiosity about the “facts on the ground.” I had some notions of what I might find (Dems tax and spend? Pubs borrow and spend?), but given how wrong I was on presidents and economic growth, I wanted to see the numbers. I encourage others to operate from similar principles.

For each year, I entered the change in spending, revenues, debt, and real GDP per capita. Then I built “lags,” so we can look at results in ensuing years. (This assuming that it takes some time to implement then see the effects of policy changes; it doesn’t happen instantly.)

Here’s the upper left corner of the spreadsheet. The “change” percentages are from a simple calc: (year2-year1)/year1.

							CHANGES IN:
							SPENDING AS % OF GDP
year	senate	house	president	dominant	congress	Mix	spend0	spend1	spend2	spend3
1961	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	1.51%	-1.31%	-0.23%	-0.21%
1962	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	-1.31%	-0.23%	-0.21%	-1.54%
1963	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	-0.23%	-0.21%	-1.54%	0.49%
1964	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	-0.21%	-1.54%	0.49%	2.35%
1965	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	-1.54%	0.49%	2.35%	0.67%
1966	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	0.49%	2.35%	0.67%	-0.39%
1967	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	2.35%	0.67%	-0.39%	0.92%
1968	D	D	D	D	DD	DDD	0.67%	-0.39%	0.92%	0.49%
1969	D	D	R	D	DD	DDR	-0.39%	0.92%	0.49%	-0.13%
1970	D	D	R	D	DD	DDR	0.92%	0.49%	-0.13%	-1.58%
1971	D	D	R	D	DD	DDR	0.49%	-0.13%	-1.58%	0.45%

As an example of lagging, the “spend1″ data is simply shifted up one year, meaning that the parties controlling the Senate, House, and Presidency get “credit” (or blame) for changes that happen a year later. Ditto for the two-, three-, and four-year lags.

Note that lagging by an additional year means there’s one less year (at the end) to evaluate. We can’t look at a three-year lag for 2008, for instance, because 2011 hasn’t happened yet. Since we’re averaging over a 49-year period, it’s to be hoped that loss of those later years will not corrupt the results excessively. (This gets more problematic when you start slicing up the data; more on that below.)

Since I don’t use any of the zero-year-lag results (I think for obvious reasons, mentioned above, which necessitate the use of lags in the first place), the graphs below don’t tell us anything about Obama’s results in 2009. Previous years’ regimes are analyzed based on the economic changes in 2009, but we have no lagging data on ensuing economic changes with which to analyze 2009. (If anyone wants to add projected data for 2010 and beyond, feel free. Just be sure to tell your readers.)

Yes, this means that the Pub presidents get blamed for 2009, but so does the Democratic congress in ’07 and ’08. Carter gets blamed for some rocky years under Reagan in ’81 and ’82. And etc., throughout the table. This is why we need to look at multiple lags and many years; it serves to average out all the allocations that might seem “unfair” in the particular.

Another method would look at the total (summed or averaged) changes over one-, two-, three-, and four-year ensuing periods. As you’ll see in the graphs below, I chose to summarize similarly by averaging the multiple lag results. I encourage others to try the other methods. I can only display so many graphs here.

As I mentioned above, the analysis gets problematic quite quickly when you start slicing the data into smaller pieces. Our short, 49-year sample quickly rears its head.

Smaller, shorter slices, for instance, might only reflect where they happen to land in the business cycle. And slices concentrated at the beginning or end of the period might be distorted by long, secular trends (geopolitical, cultural, technological) that have nothing to do with party control — Matthew Arnold’s “ebb and flow of human misery.”

Here’s the number of years since ’61 for different regime combinations (Senate/House/President):

RRD	6
RDR	6
RRR	6
DDD	15
DDR	16

A comparison of DDD to DDR looks like the most promising in this set of slices because they’re both lengthy and scattered through the 49-year period. Since the only difference is in presidential control, that comparison may have special applicability to the presidency question that launched this investigation, #8.

The smaller slices will be much more subject to business cycles and secular trends. For instance, we’ve got three six-year, single-president slices. RDR is a single span from ’81–’86, when Volcker and Reagan, with a mixed Congress, were trying to pull us out of the biggest recession since World War II (and succeeding) and a 40-year cold war (eventually succeeding). It seems foolish to draw any grand, sweeping conclusions from that single and arguably anomalous slice.

Likewise: RRD is 1995 to 2000 (Clinton), and RRR is 2001 to 2006 (Bush II) — the first a massive boom (bubble?), the other a recession and tepid recovery. Hard to make useful comparisons.

DDD and DDR, by comparison, reflect sixteen- and fifteen-year slices scattered from the beginning to the end of the period.

Anyone can feel free to write narratives based on comparing all these slices. I’ve presented them in the graphs below. But with the exception of DDD and DDR comparisons, I would suggest that those spins will be statistically spurious. You’re just telling stories about single presidencies, which is exactly what we’re trying to overcome here.

Here are the Senate/House combos:

DD	31
RD	6
RR	12

In those 49 years we’ve never had a Democratic Senate and Republican House. And in only six years have we had mixed Congressional control (those six Reagan years). These two facts, especially combined, make it largely impossible to throw any real light on question #7 (mixed versus monolithic control) with this analysis.

DD is a large and scattered sample with both R and D presidents. RR is a single span late in the period — 1995–2006 — so it’s more subject to distortion by longer-term trends, but it’s half under Clinton, half under Bush II. RR and DD comparisons might yield insights.

Larry Bartels ran into these same difficulties when trying to add the effects of the legislature to his regressions. He uses different phrasing in his explanation, which I’ll let you peruse in a footnote.*

If you’re so inclined, you can also slice the data in the spreadsheet by the “dominant” party — the one controlling two out of three branches. I didn’t find much of interest there, but go to town. Again, I can only display so many graphs without it all becoming meaningless spaghetti.

The Graphs

One more bit of explanation — of the graphs themselves — is necessary here.

I’ve made the assumption that parties can have a somewhat immediate effect on taxes, spending, and debt. So for those measures I’ve given the average of only the one- and two-year lags. I’ve shown all four bars, though, so you can see the numbers and, if you think it’s useful, eyeball-average them.

For changes in real GDP per capita — which is a second-order effect and hence (in [my] theory at least) takes longer to appear — I’ve given the average of all four lags. You can produce any other calculations or presentations you want using the spreadsheet.

The highlighted averages are generally in the vertical position indicating their values, except where I’ve had to move them to avoid obscuring information.

That said, here we go.

Taxes

Revenues as a percent of GDP. This means there’s no need to correct for inflation, with the inherent uncertainties of that correction. Short story, everybody cuts taxes except Democratic presidents.

President

Democratic presidents raise taxes. Republican presidents lower them. Alert the media. (This graph shows nicely why I don’t pay much attention to three- and four-year lags for changes in revenues, spending, and debt.)

Senate

Surprise: Dem senators are tax cutters — just not as much as Pubs. For both parties, the effects are dwarfed by presidential differences.

House

Pretty much the same as the Senate, except that Dem House members cut taxes more than Republicans.

Congress

DDs and RRs are remarkably similar, with small magnitudes.

Combined

The DDD and DDR results are quite similar to the presidential results, above.

Spending

Again, as a percent of GDP so we needn’t correct for inflation. Republican presidents and Democratic senators are the big spenders, followed by Democratic house members. Democratic presidents are as frugal as Republican legislators.

President

Republican presidents raise spending significantly faster than Democrats.

Senate

Dem senators, on the other hand, increase spending something like eight times as fast as Republicans. The data reads darned consistently here, and unlike with taxation, the magnitudes are similar to presidential changes.

House

Almost the same as the Senate: Democrats increase spending faster than Republicans, and with magnitudes similar to the Senate and Presidents.

Congress

Again very similar to the Senate and House. Democrats in Congress increase spending much faster than Republicans.

Combined

DDD vs. DDR basically reflects the presidential differences.

Debt

As a percent of GDP. Somebody might want to add columns to the spreadsheet showing deficit changes, and look at it that way instead.

President

Profoundly large magnitudes and differences here, and remarkably consistent even into the three- and four-year lags.

Senate

Democratic senators, unlike presidents, increase the debt — but nowhere near as fast as Republicans. Smaller magnitudes here than with presidents.

House

Not so the House. Republican congresspeople are more frugal than their Democratic colleagues. Magnitude a bit less than the Senate, far less than presidents.

Congress

DDs and RRs are basically the same.

Combined

DDD versus DDR again mirrors the presidential results.

Real GDP per Capita

This measure is, necessarily, corrected for inflation. Changes in real personal income, a la Bartels, would arguably be a good alternative or additional measure.

President

Lags two and three show the parties in parity. Lags one and four create a Democratic advantage to the tune of .5% extra growth per year.

Senate

Very consistent, and very little difference between the parties. Magnitudes similar to presidents’.

House

Also fairly consistent (though the one-year lag shows party parity) and with similar magnitudes, with the Democrats associated with faster growth.

Congress

Democratic congresses are associated with higher GDP growth than Republicans.

Combined

DDD and DDR again mirror presidential results, though somewhat more pronounced.

Summary

Here’s a summary of all the average changes. (Remember: revenues, spending, and debt changes are averaged over the one- and two-year lags. Real GDP per capita changes are averaged over all four lags.)

Conclusions

Here’s my narrative. You can call it spin, but I hope you’ll at least agree that it’s not contradicted by the facts as they’re analyzed here. Feel free to copy and paste these graphs (credit please), or create your own, and write your own story.

1. On revenues and spending,  presidential effects appear to overwhelm congressional effects. This is not surprising when you consider the presidential drives behind Reagan and Bush II’s tax cuts and defense buildups, Johnson’s Great Society plus Vietnam, Clinton’s tax increases, etc.

2. Everyone increases spending (Republican legislators just barely) — Democrats significantly more than Republicans.

3. Only Democratic presidents have the political courage to raise taxes. (Given this, their ability to get elected at all says a lot for their popularity.)

4. Of Republicans, only House members hold the line on debt, due to tiny changes in both revenues and spending.

5. Democratic presidents are the only ones to reduce the debt — and they do so in a big way.  (See #3.)

6. Overall, Democratic control is associated with greater growth in real GDP per capita. (In the Senate, Pubs and Dems are essentially the same.) To do the arithmetic for you: if Republican presidents had managed equal increases during their 28 years in power, GDP/capita would be approximately 15% higher than it is today — $53K per person per year, as opposed to $46K.

And if Larry Bartels’ graph is any indication, far more of that (greater) GDP would be flowing through the hands of the middle class.

That’s my story and I’m sticking to it (unless you convince me otherwise).

————————

* You’ll need to know, or learn to use, Excel’s pivot tables — which you should do in any case cause they kick ass. I’ve given brief instructions in the spreadsheet. The graphs require some slightly sophisticated hand-tuning (data sources, label displays, axes, etc.) depending on what you’re trying to show.

** From Unequal Democracy, page 34 (screen grab so I don’t have to type it in):

Asymptosis Uncategorized

I posted recently about how profoundly regressive state and local taxes are, with my home state of Washington being the very worst. A new initiative proposal by Bill Gates Sr. to institute a state income tax on high earners (while reducing business and property taxes) prompted me to revisit the issue.

My question: are states with more progressive taxes more or less prosperous? Do their economies grow faster or slower?

Short answer: no. In aggregate, there’s almost no difference between states with more-progressive taxes and those with less progressive regimes.

Even though both progressivity and economic growth vary wildly among states, there’s only a very small positive correlation between progressivity and growth in prosperity (change in Real GDP per capita):

And there’s a small negative correlation between progressivity and prosperity (2008 GDP per capita):

Both of these correlations (.06 and -.05) are too small to tell us anything at all. Either progressivity has no effect on these measures, or we can’t tell what the effect is.

For those who want the details or to play around with the numbers, the spreadsheet’s here.

Update May 7: I forgot to mention that I looked at this same subject before, comparing prosperous countries. More progressive countries seem to grow slightly faster. (Positive correlation: .13.)

Asymptosis Uncategorized

“As debate over the dimensions of Obama’s package snaked through the House…”

Source.

Asymptosis Uncategorized

What do you think, is this the same 29% that were still Bush-boosters in 2008?

AFTER HEARING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PROPOSED [FINANCIAL] REFORMS, VOTER SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION INCREASED

• At the start of the survey, 29% opposed reform, and 40% supported it.
• After details were explained and arguments for and against reform described, opposition stayed at 29% but support rose to over 60%.

Pew survey. The survey gathered demographics on respondents, but I don’t find any cross-tabs on demographics for that 29%. Enquiring minds…

Asymptosis Uncategorized

I mean cap-C Conservative. Do Conservatives and Republicans value honesty?

I ask in the context of Jonathan Haidt’s research into moral spheres, and which spheres are important to different political groups. (Blogged here and here.)

In response to Haidt’s $1,000 challenge for people to come up with additions to his five spheres, Tim Dean proposes the one that also came immediately to my mind when I first saw the challenge: truth/honesty.

“You should tell the truth” is obviously a widespread or perhaps universal moral intuition. (Though of course it’s not categorical–none of these intuitions is.) And it’s easy to understand how that predilection would have evolved.

I don’t know if truth/honesty merits a place in Haidt’s pantheon — there are complicated issues of interacting and overlapping moral spheres, touched on below. But I am curious about the same thing Tim Dean is:

Another interesting test would be to see how self declared liberals and conservatives respond to issues of truth/honesty. My guess would be that conservatives would rate truth/honesty as being more important than liberals.

My intuition: Conservatives would be shown to rank honesty differently depending on the context of the situation.

• In private, direct, and especially face-to-face situations, I think there’s a 50% probability that Tim is right, that conservatives would care more about honesty than liberals. Significantly more? Very low odds, I think.

• In the public realm — especially the realm of public debate — I think they would be shown to rank honesty very low relative to other spheres, especially group loyalty.

I would suggest that this is a result of conservatives’ greater concern for group loyalty. When the context is groups — promoting them, defending them — both the truth and the fairness realms are downgraded to the benefit of the loyalty realm. In a further (meta) downgrading of honesty, they would be expected to give lip service to honesty while failing to practice it. Think: “fair and balanced.”

This highlights the problematic nature of Haidt’s realms — the interactions between those realms — and the need for research that teases out those interactions. It also highlights the need to distinguish different groups’ moral weightings in different contexts.

Unfortunately, those necessities would/will turn Haidt’s fairly easy-to-understand model into a far more complex field of study — much as genetic interactions and epigenetics have done to genetics.

Asymptosis Uncategorized

People are obviously unemployed because they want to be.

The Big Picture » Blog Archive » An Epidemic of Laziness?.

Update: More data here.

Asymptosis Uncategorized